This has been a very dark week for Europe and the world, with Russian president Putin launching a full-on military invasion of a sovereign country that few – according to experts even the Russian public – had expected him to be capable of. 24 February 2022 will go down in the history books as a turning point in the history of the post-Soviet world. If we needed even further proof that history had not ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the liberal-democratic model had not achieved its ultimate triumphed, this was it.

This historic event puts into question most of what many thought to be true just a week ago. From a British perspective this was strikingly illustrated by resurfaced footage of Johnson being grilled about defence spending only a few months ago and – in a sign of his great ignorance – confidently declaring that “the old concepts of fighting big tank battles on European land mass are over."  

After 2/24, no one can have any illusions anymore about Putin and his intentions. Right-wing as well as left-wing Putin apologists – from the UK, to France, to Germany, and Hungary – some of them facing imminent re-election battles – find themselves in a difficult position explaining to voters their previous pro-Russian positions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a truly momentous event that will reshape British and global politics.

The war on Ukraine and Brexit

It would certainly be exaggerated to see Putin’s war on Ukraine as a direct result of Brexit – but only just. The two events are intrinsically related. For one, both are cases of an autocrat sacrificing the future of his people in an attempt to recreate a glorified imperial past when everything was better. For the other, one could argue that both Brexit and the Invasion of Ukraine were strategic goals of Putin’s foreign policy. Indeed, for years Putin has wanted ‘a weak, divided and fragmented EU.’ Brexit was arguably the single most important event on the path to achieving this and may have made Putin more confident about his imperialist West-ward expansion.

Yet, even for those who are sceptical of such a direct link between Putin’s strategic goals and Brexit, there is no denying that Brexit, Brexiters, and the Tory party are inextricably entangled with Putin’s regime. Therefore, beyond the horrific consequences of the invasion for Ukrainian and Russian people, the war on Ukraine will potentially have far-reaching implications for UK domestic politics too. It could further accelerate a phenomenon that I call ‘the autophagy of the Brexit movement,’ which we have seen emerge in the past months. To understand how, it is useful to go back to the fundamental nature of the Brexit project.

Brexit: The elite revolting against itself

In true populist fashion, Brexiters like to think of Brexit as a revolt of the people against the elites and any opposition to it as a betrayal of democracy. No doubt, Brexit was a constitutional- and as such a revolutionary moment in British history as pro-Brexit academic Vernon Bogdanor puts it. Yet, it increasingly turns out it was a revolution of the British kind. Just like the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 can be considered a revolution only by stretching the concept beyond the bounds of its meaning, so Brexit can be seen as a revolt by the people only by stretching both “revolt” and “people” beyond any meaningful definition. Indeed, just like 1688, 2016 was mainly an elite revolting against itself – with some effort to create a semblance of popular support for purposes of political mobilisation and legitimacy. Indeed, only in the ‘closed system’ of British upper-classism can Farage, Johnson and other leaders of the Brexit movement be seen as part of some sort of counter-elite. They certainly have nothing in common with the ‘ordinary people’ whose preferences they claim to represent. As such, the revolt they led is one of the elite against itself and therefore ultimately an inherently self-devouring movement.

Put crudely, there are two reasons why people do not like the EU: Firstly, many people believe it is firmly ingrained in the 1980s type market-fundamentalist paradigm and therefore a dogmatic ‘liberalisation machine’ that sees market-based competition as the only valid organisational principle for societies. As such, it aims to destroy any institutions that traditionally protected people from the raw forces of markets, such as trade unions, the welfare state, public ownership of utilities etc. That view is not entirely wrong of course, as the EU has arguably been a leading actor in liberalising economies and has undoubtedly had negative effects on workers and trade unions for instance. But of course, depending on where a member state starts from, EU membership may also be a ‘civilising force,’ compelling countries to increase rather than reduce its standards (worker or environmental protections in the UK being a case in point). Secondly, people who may not dislike the EU’s effect on liberalisation and market competition, still may dislike it for a second – related – effect, namely breaking up traditional relationship-based ways of doing business and politics. Up until the 1970s, the UK – like other European countries – was dominated by ‘club government’ where people who went to school together and played golf on the same golf courses managed the affairs of their country and their economy based on personal acquaintance, shared norms, and ‘gentlemen’s agreements.’

Since the 1970s, European countries moved towards a more formal rules- and regulations-based system, which opened up the ‘old-boys’ networks to outsiders and increased transparency and accountability in political and economic affairs. Indeed, the rise of a so-called market-supporting ‘regulatory state’ and the decline of informal ‘club government’ had two effects: Firstly, it created enormous opportunities for market participants to make money in newly liberalised and privatised formerly protected areas of the economy. Secondly, for new markets to be able to emerge in this fashion, it was necessary that anonymous market participants played by a set of formal rules, which guarantee levels of transparency and accountability that personal relationships do not.

The trend towards formal, rules-based interactions sometimes comes at a cost, as local knowledge and informal – and moral – ways of organising an economy are replaced with anonymous, market-based “arm’s-length” interactions following fixed, formal regulatory rules. Sometimes, the traditional informal ways are worthy of protection, because they are well-adapted to the local conditions and are more socially and environmentally sustainable than the large-scale, anonymous, market-based alternatives.

 Yet, optimists see the trend away from relationships toward formal rules and regulations as a process of “democratisation” in the sense that what was previously done based on privilege is now subject to meritocracy and fair competition. Rather than having to be a member of an exclusive club, knowing the right people, and being from the right background, in the rules-based system access is based on transparent public standards and merit. I think that is an overly optimistic interpretation, because the actors who filled the gaps torn into the fabric of what Michael Moran calls Victorina-age ‘club government’ are not just ‘ordinary people,’ but to a large extent members of the same privileged elite. Still, it is precisely for this second reason that the Brexiters among the British elite disliked the EU. Indeed, Brexiters love the first bit of the new system (making money due to new opportunities), but they hate the second (complying to rules that guarantee transparency and accountability).

This ambiguous effect of the move towards the ‘regulatory state’ – creating opportunities to amass private riches, but making these activities more transparent and rule-governed in theory – explains the rise since the 1970s of a massive industry for offshoring private fortunes of the wealthy and powerful as revealed for instance by data leaks like the Pandora-, Paradise-, Panama Papers, and the very recent Suisse Secrets. Liberalisation, privatisation and the increasing reliance on transparent formal rules on the one hand, and the emergence of the murky universe of tax avoidance and offshore money centres on the other, are hence two sides of the same coin.

While the EU was not the cause of the move away from ‘club government’ towards the ‘regulatory state,’ the EU played a role in advancing this trend.  In this context, some have seen the increasing eagerness of rich and powerful Brits to leave the EU as a direct result of EU’s anti-tax avoidance directive (atad). Such a direct link may be exaggerated when explaining specific steps in the Brexit process, but the basic point that the rich and powerful dislike anything that constrains or sheds light on their unsatiable drive to accumulate wealth holds and is crucial in understanding why the Tory party became the party taking the UK out of the EU.

In short, the Brexit project is based on the fundamental contradictory goal of seeking to further liberalise markets and public goods for private benefits, while rejecting the necessary corollary of liberal markets, i.e. a rules-based regulatory system. Now that their revolution has succeeded – or, as Chris Grey puts it – now that the dogs have caught the car, this inherent unsolvable contradictions in the Brexit project has become unmanageable. It necessarily leads to the movement’s self-consumption or autophagy.

The Autophagy of the Brexit Movement

There were at least three examples this past week that illustrate how the self-contradictory nature of the Brexit project is leading to its autophagy.

First, there was the widely commented case of Rees-Mogg – newly appointed Brexit Opportunities and Government Efficiency Minister (BOGEMin) – who – as I noted last week – initially seemed to announce a paradigm shift away from post-Brexit Britain’s refusal to consider any regulatory alignment with the EU for fear of not making most of its regained ‘sovereignty.’ Yet, the BOGEMin was quickly shot down by Downing Street, exposing not only his incompetence, but also the fact that his ‘naïve radicalism’ is at “odds with the broader Brexit ‘coalition’ that supports but also constrains his government.”

It may very well be that Rees-Mogg simply does not care whether his policy programme makes sense, since he has still ample opportunity besides his role in government to enrich himself (e.g. by offloading his investment companies’ Russian assets just before sanctions hit). Or perhaps he thinks it does not matter what deregulatory strategy he adopts, because in his mind realising Brexit opportunities only requires a wrecking ball and no positive policy programme. Indeed, his ‘naïve radicalism’ is based on market fundamentalist thinking that sees markets as spontaneous, natural orders, that flourish when the state is removed/destroyed/starved of funding rather than as being state-made constructs. Regardless, the BOGEMin’s split personality over regulatory alignment and sovereignty nicely illustrates the impossibility of squaring the circle of Brexit promises and explains why ultimately the Brexit movement must consume itself.

The second striking example of autophagy was Ian Duncan Smith’s letter in the Daily Mail ranting against the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP). Chris Grey has written a superb line-by-line takedown of all the falsehoods and inconsistencies contained in that piece. So, no need to repeat any of that here. What is interesting is that fundamentally the piece constitutes a frontal attack of 2022 Ian Duncan Smith on 2019 Ian Duncan Smith who loudly and proudly supported the NIP as part of Johnson’s ‘oven ready deal’ to get Brexit done. It may be that he simply did not understand what he was voting for back in 2019. Yet, more likely, 2019 IDS was so obsessed with ridding the UK of rules and regulations that constrain the ruling elite’s ability to enrich itself that he readily accepted a flagrant breach of the Brexiters’ promise to ‘take back control’ by leaving part of the country in the EU’s single market and erecting a barrier inside the UK. Three years later, 2022 IDS is struggling to accept the dissonant situation he contributed to creating and has no other option than reneging what he stood for in 2019 (incidentally – in further signs of Brexit autophagy – 2022 IDS is also mad at Johnson, as is Nigel Farage).

The third example of Brexiter autophagy is Johnson’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Johnson’s response was feeble and confused. The government’s initial reaction was to impose sanctions on five banks – four of which were already under US sanctions – and on three Russian oligarchs. While Johnson himself called his sanction plan ‘draconian,’ commentators and experts like Dr. Elisabeth Schimpfössl considered it ‘a joke’ (in German here, substantively same argument in English here) and equated it with ‘turning up to a gun fight with a peashooter.’ Later in the week, Johnson showed a bit more spine by early on supporting removing Russian banks from SWIFT international payment system. Yet, this more courageous stance was cancelled out by Home Secretary Priti Patel’s and others’ shameful hesitance to unconditionally accept Ukrainian refugees.

The confused, contradictory, and weak stance of the Johnson government in the Ukraine crisis is – once again – not coincidental but inherently linked to the Brexit project. The connections between the Conservative party and influential rich Russians are many and well documented. They reach from donations to business ties (e.g. Tory MP Greg Barker at one stage serving as executive chairman of Russia’s En+ group). While Johnson refused to let Parliament investigate if Russia interfered with the Brexit referendum directly, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament’s (heavily redacted) ‘Russia report’ clearly shows that – contrary to the US government after the 2016 election – the UK government did not take the threat of Russian interference seriously and did not even try and establish whether interference had taken place during the EU referendum. The report also suggest that MI5 basically accepts the findings of academic studies that interference has taken place.

In this context, in another sign of autophagy, Tory MPs and other prominent Brexiters now have to perform contortions to distance themselves from Russian money – shouting down opposition MPs in Parliament and going as far as threatening Twitter users with lawsuits for pointing out connections they themselves previously bragged about. Again, this is not a random result of a random event, but a logical consequence of the inherent contradictions of the Brexit project. Brexit was orchestrated and bankrolled by an international of right-wing plutocrats – reaching from Rupert Murdoch, to Steve Bannon, and various Russian Oligarchs –, but was sold to the people by supposedly anti-elite members of the elite as a patriotic project of national rejuvenation. Sooner or later, this contradiction had to come to the surface and force Brexiters to engage in denial and autophagy.

Back in 2018 I attended a conference at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)  – an elite university close to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs – where one speaker – a Russian Orthodox bishop – indignantly commented on the UK’s reaction to the Skripal poising in Saulsbury. He angrily blustered that if you hit the Russian bear it will bite you, but if you hit the English lion it will whimper and stay down. While the metaphor of ‘poking the Russian bear’ as explanation – or even justification – of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is greatly misleading, given how easy it is to turn - with a sufficient amount of money - the three English lions into lapdogs, one cannot blame the bishop for considering the UK a weak country.

What needs to happen now are two things: firstly, the UK government needs to get serious about its sanctions not just on Russian banks, but also the individuals closest to Putin. Indeed, as I argued four years ago, ineffectual condemnation is fuel to the warmongers in Putin’s circle and plays into his strategy of creating foreign enemies to garner domestic support, without reducing Putin’s capacity to divide and rule the West. Therefore, sanctions need to be decisive and genuinely hurt Putin and his inner circle to be successful.

Secondly, the opposition parties in the UK need to continue exposing the links the governing party has with Russian oligarchs and other foreign funders and use the current tragedy as an opportunity to clean up the corrupt British political system. Opposition parties need to make people understand that it is the kleptocratic, parasitic elite at the top – and not refugees crossing the Channel in dinghies – that is responsible for their economic hardship and constitutes a threat to our country’s security.