In the shadow of the autumn budget and the preparation for the COP26 climate summit, the past week’s Brexit-related news were dominated by the escalating row with France over fishing rights. In the meantime, as expected, things have been relatively quiet around the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP). In the past few days, the EU seems to have made its stance on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issue very explicit by reportedly stating that the ECJ’s role under the NIP was not up for negotiation. This would make it more likely for the UK government to trigger Art. 16 of the protocol that would allow it to partially suspend certain provisions. It is very unlikely that such a move would lead to anything else than a further hardening of the positions on both sides.
There were also rather worrying, although less high-profile news items that suggest that the worse is still to come in terms of Brexit. Importantly, the EU’s grace periods on the ‘rules of origin’ which need to be met for UK products to qualify for tariff-free exported to the EU will end in two months’ time. Most British businesses are reportedly not ready for the change, which could have a major impact on UK exports. Similarly, the slow return to some kind of normality as the pandemic is waning in many European countries – although not in the UK -, means that other Brexit-induced problems that we have largely been spared so far, are starting to rear their ugly heads. These include the problems that touring artists and musicians are facing.
So, everything suggests that we have not seen the worst of Brexit yet. Indeed, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) now expects the long-term impact of Brexit on GDP growth to be around twice as bad as the impact of the pandemic. All this is happening in front of the backdrop of a government that increasingly looks like a typical populist government that is stuck in its ideology and unable to develop any coherent strategy.
The (painful) return of live music
Now that live concerts and festivals are back on, voices from the music industry are growing stronger, warning about the catastrophic impact that the new post-Brexit rules for touring musicians have on the industry. A recent EU-UK Forum event on the impact of Brexit on the cultural industry illustrated that in this respect the devil truly is in the detail. Some of the issues that make UK artists’ life difficult include the cost of visas (in excess of £180 per performer in Spain for instance), the fact that value added tax (VAT) has to be accounted for in each single country where merchandise is sold rather than just once for a multi-country tour, but also much more subtle issues such as the fact that transporting across international borders instruments that contain ivory requires special certificates. Another issue is that while the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) does not cover services and hence the music industry, the rules about road transport still apply. Here, the TCA does not distinguish between moving someone else’s goods as a haulier and moving goods on one’s own account. That means that the cabotage rules apply to musicians touring the EU in their own van with their own instruments. The cabotage rules – recently relaxed in the UK in order to address the lorry driver shortage – imply that the number of unloads in the EU is limited to three in ten days, after which the truck has to return to the UK before being allowed to re-enter the EU. Besides the environmental impact of such a policy, it adds to the costs of tours.
Many of these issues certainly are the result of the Johnson government’s reckless approach to exiting the EU without a plan and at any cost. In a message to a panel on the impact of Brexit on the music industry organised this week by West Country Bylines composer Howard Goodall called the omission of services from the TCA ‘not only […] an act of gross negligence, it was an act of economic madness for the UK’ that does enormous damage ‘to the livelihoods of the many, many thousands of people working in the creative industries.’
However, not all these issues can be attributed to negligence, recklessness, or lack of interest in details. Mark Pemberton, Director of the Association of British Orchestras, speaking at the EU-UK Forum event, underscored that on the cabotage rules, the UK side had been aware of the problem during the negotiations of the TCA and had asked for a different rule. Yet, that request was refused by the EU. No doubt, Brexiters will see that as EU ‘punishment.’ Yet, the fact is that the UK has chosen to break free from the EU and enter the post-Brexit world in which – as Chris Grey aptly puts it – “the currency is relative power.” Outside of the legal order of the EU, the UK negotiates with the bloc and its members states in the space of international politics where everything is political and hence subject to differential power relations and ultimately force. And that brings us to the fishery row with France.
The shape of things to come: Fishing rights and new British vulnerabilities
The row over fishing licences for French boats that want to fish in UK waters is interesting in many respects. For one, it illustrates that Brexit and all the problems it brings with it are not just problems that opposes the UK to the EU, but that potentially opposes the UK to each one of the member states as well. Indeed, in the case of fishing licences, the conflict is partly spurred by France’s internal political logic. With a tight presidential election contest looming next year, President Macron will be wary to show that he supports French fishermen who have been tempted to vote for far-right challengers of the President in the past. In this context, the escalation of the situation is not too surprising. Still, the very openly confrontational language used on both sides does seem unusual. Thus, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs Clément Beaune stated that “[n]ow we need to speak the language of force because, unfortunately, that seems to be the only thing this British Government understands.” Similarly, French Minister of the Sea Annick Girardin characterised the situation [FR] as ‘not war, but a battle.’ Perhaps this was meant as a conciliatory note, but even just being in a battle with your neighbour sounds bad enough. The UK government in turn signalled its readiness for a tit-for-that approach that may be ensuing, with George Eustice saying ‘two can play at that game.’
Another interesting aspect of the row, is the contrast between the confrontational language used by top politicians on both sides and what RTE’s Tony Connelly reported to be a ‘very technical, non-political, non-controversial exchange of information’ between French and UK officials in the EU-UK Specialised Committee for fisheries set up under the TCA. This contrast illustrates a point that for our, post-war generation may not seem of much importance, but is arguably one of the EU’s greatest achievements. Namely, to pacify the interactions between European countries in various areas by making them questions of technicalities rather than leaving them in the realm of politics where they become questions tied in with national identity, pride, and power.
Of course, that function or effect of the EU is also one of the most widely-shared critiques – both on the left and the right – of ‘Brussels’ as a huge technocratic machine that somehow usurps democratic power by subtracting important issues of daily life from direct democratic scrutiny and subjecting it to technocratic governance instead. That is to some extent a fair and understandable criticism. But the fishery row precisely provides an example that ‘technocratising’ and subtracting certain questions from the political realm is not always a bad thing. One of the great benefits of bureaucratisation is precisely to take the passion and emotion out of important issues and thus subject them to more rational policy-making. Brexit has moved these issues back into the realm of politics, which implies that at every turn the political logic may dominate rational policy-making. In that respect, Clément’s statement that force is the only language the UK government understands is shocking, but spot on.
Finally, the fisheries row also reveals the position the UK has manoeuvred itself into. Brexit was meant to be a great liberation. Instead, as the French reaction shows, the UK has become vulnerable and exposed to retaliation measures from its neighbours. Indeed, what is remarkable about the list of retaliatory measures set out by the French government is that some of them are actually nothing more than strictly enforcing the customs checks that have been agreed in the TCA. In other words, the post-Brexit arrangement that the UK has signed up to provides the EU and its member states with new leverage and power over the UK. That was inevitable and a simple fact of leaving the Single Market and not a result of the fact that the TCA is a suboptimal agreement for the UK. But the fact is that ‘taking back control’ seems to have conferred new means of control to the UK’s neighbours.
Of course Johnson threatens to retaliate – but just like you cannot defeat gravity, so there is no denying that any ‘trade war’ between the UK and the EU will damage the UK far more than the members of the much larger Single Market. The UK’s vulnerability will further increase with the entry into force of the full range of export rules on January 1st, 2022.
The Hugo Chavez path to self-destruction
Given that dark Brexit clouds are gathering once again, it is crucial to understand what the UK government is seeking to achieve. We are closing in on two years of Johnson government, but it remains difficult to understand what that is. This is partly due to the fact that there are no consistent policies in any area, as Chris Grey convincingly argued this week. The lack of a consistent policy does not concern just Brexit-related issues, but virtually every policy area. For instance, the Commons’ decision to let water companies dump raw sewage into rivers and the sea at a time when the government portrays itself as a world leader of the green transition ahead of the COP26 summit perfectly illustrates the lack of coherence. Moreover, once again, the government ultimately had to make a U-turn on the issue in face of the public backlash. The image of the out-of-control shopping trolley smashing into aisles left, right, and centre springs to mind once again.
It is not just inconsistent individual policies the government is adopting that leave one puzzling though. It is not easy to figure out what the ultimate goal – if any – the UK government’s actions (to avoid the term strategy) are meant to achieve. Many attempts at explaining the government’s behaviour try to rationalise the government’s actions by identifying some overarching goal. Thus, Chris Grey has repeatedly advanced the mad-man strategy whereby the government wants ‘the other side’ to believe that it will not shy away from even the most extreme and harmful course of action in order to get what it asks for. Similarly, I have repeatedly referred to the ‘chaos theory of Brexit’ which surmises that the government’s actions can be understood as a strategy to inflict maximum damage in the believe that weakening the EU is somehow good for the UK. One reader of my blog commented that a simpler explanation is that this government only has one goal, which is to remain in power. That is another plausible explanation, but it does not sit comfortably with some of the most self-destructive and harmful actions the government has undertaken. Thus, rising living costs due to the stubborn insistence on self-harming immigration rules that induce labour shortages, cuts to welfare spending, and sacrificing farmers’ livelihoods to be able to claim a rare ‘Brexit dividend’ by signing reckless trade deals are hardly conducive to achieving that mid-term, selfish goal.
So, there must be a more fundamental explanation of the behaviours and actions we observe that does not have to rely on the assumption that there is some sort of goal or ultimate strategy. It may be hard to believe that Johnson and his government actually believe in anything other than their own interests. As such, the most likely behaviour we would expect from the government is that of cynical opportunism – and we certainly have plenty of examples of that sort of behaviour by Johnson and his fellow Brexiters. Yet, there may be another layer to it that is of the order of deep convictions and values. And this may be what makes this government particularly dangerous for the country.
I have repeatedly pointed out the parallels between the UK government’s policies and Victor Orbàn’s illiberal or post-liberal transformation of Hungary. There is one important difference between Johnson and Orbàn, however. Namely, Orbàn has a coherent and quite successful industrial strategy. For my research project, we interview German business leaders working in Hungary, who often tell us that for a company that is active in the right sector (i.e. a sector that does not threaten Orban’s interests or his nationalist strategy), working with the Orbàn government is a very smooth and beneficial experience. There is a clear strategy that has allowed the regime to attract a lot of foreign direct investment to the country and thus provides jobs. Orbàn does enrich himself and people close to him, but in parallel there seems to be a genuine concern and strategy for the economic development of the country. It is hard to detect any similar concern for the common good in the actions of the Johnson government. The haphazard, bombastic, three-word-slogan driven policies hardly amount to an industrial strategy.
The only consistent trait of the Johnson government’s behaviours is the agonistic and confrontational understanding of politics that underlies everything it does. Domestically, it is the ‘real,’ ‘little,’ ‘authentic’ people against the ‘woke,’ ‘intellectuals,’ or ‘urban elites.’ Internationally, it’s Britannia against the EU, the Anglosphere against China etc. Partly this may be a strategy that helps to explain in simple terms to core voters what Johnson stands for (the ‘us’). However, I increasingly feel attributing too much strategic intent to this government may be giving it too much credit. The ‚us v. them’ approach may not be a carefully calculated electoral strategy, but more just an instinct. It may not be a means to an end, but simply the reflection on Johnson’s and other Brexiters’ worldview. They see the world as a neat opposition of black and white (in some cases literally), good and bad, in and out, us and them. This Manichean world view leaves no room for compromise and no need for reasoned public discussion, because there are only two sides to the coin and these sides are established and immutable. There is no need for expertise either, because ‘the real people’ intuitively know through their ‘common sense’ what is right. There is no need to listen to the ‘other’ who is irredeemably ‘not one of us.’
It is this worldview that makes the Johnson government not so much resemble Orbàn’s Hungary (although Orbàn does adhere to some of these views too), but more the suicide mission that Hugo Chavez embarked Venezuela on. Indeed, experts of left-wing populism in Latin America have shown that a key feature of that type of populism is a fundamentally and irredeemably conflict-centred view of politics. This view sees the political process not as one of reasoned argumentation with a view to solve problems or find agreement or compromises amongst a multitude of legitimate interests and preferences in society. Rather, politics is about establishing political distinctions between friends and enemies in order to unify and reaffirm popular demands against the dominance of elites. It is by ‘affirming difference and separating actors, [that] political identities come into being.’ Worryingly, this approach to politics that necessarily leads to division and strive is not only characteristic of left-wing populists like Hugo Chavez, but has close affinities – albeit with inverted signs – with the theories of right-wing thinker and Nazi-jurist Carl Schmitt.
Concretely, in the case of the Johnson government, this worldview has two consequences: Firstly, it leads to a very high pain barrier: Given the high stake of the battle between the absolute good and the absolute evil, adherents to this ideology are willing to sacrifice a great deal. An illustration of this came this week in the form of Environment Secretary George Eustice’s claim that he was “quite happy to live with the consequences” of Brexit after the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecast that the economic impact of Brexit would be double that of the pandemic. Of course, one can legitimately argue that Eustice is not the one who will be struggling paying their bills, finding a job, putting food on the table as a result of the Brexit-induced economic decline. But I think there is a more fundamental truth in what he said, which is precisely that we are engaged in an eternal battle that – like any war – requires sacrifices.
The other, consequence is that any political interaction and any international negotiation necessarily has to have a winner and a loser. Compromise and ‘meeting in the middle,’ do not exist in the black-and-white world of absolutes. If you win, I lose. Therefore, the only reasonable stance to take in a negotiation is to ask for everything. Not in order to get as much as possible after negotiation and compromise, but because it is the only thing that makes sense.
In his message to the West Country Bylines panel, Sir Howard Goodall asked: ‘What kind of person goes into politics with this grim, two-fingers-to-the-neighbours gesture as their legacy?’ The answer is the ideologically blinded, Manichean populists that currently occupy the highest spheres of the Tory party and of British politics.
This interpretation implies that the Johnson government’s approach is not some sort of elaborate strategy that eventually can be changed into something more conciliatory. Rather it is the only game in town as long as this government is in power. Or, as Emma de Souza writes in the Irish Times, as long as Johnson and his fellow Brexiters are in power, there will be a ‘forever war with the EU.’
Brexit has moved our relationships with our neighbours back into the realm of international politics where problems are ultimately solved based on power and (threat of) force. In that realm realism and pragmatism are key. It does not look like this government is capable of providing that.
A rude awakening is still awaiting many Brexiters who dream of Global Britain, but will have to come to terms with the reality of power relations in today’s global economy. The writing is on the wall both in terms of the NIP, fishing rights, and yet more border disruptions to come. This will potentiall be painful, but it increasingly looks like a rude awakening is the only thing that can move the country away from the Hugo Chavez path to self-destruction that it has embarked on.